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I. INTRODUCTION
1

In its 2012 decision in Miller v. Alabama, the United States
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a mandatory sentence of
life without the possibility of parole for children, barring states from
automatically imposing the sentence on the basis of the crime
committed and without individualized consideration of the
defendant’s status as a child or of the child’s particular life
2
circumstances. In the process, the Court declined to impose a
categorical ban on such sentences because of the possibility that—
although the instances should be “uncommon”—jurors could find
3
some children are “irreparably corrupted” or “irretrievably
4
depraved.” The Court also declined to decide the issue whether there
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1. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
2. Id. at 2461. According to the Court, the sentence of mandatory life without parole for
juveniles “runs afoul of our cases’ requirement of individualized sentencing for defendants
facing the most serious penalties.” Id. Miller consolidates two cases, Miller v. Alabama, which
was on writ of certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama, and Jackson v. Hobbs,
which was on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Arkansas. The majority opinion in
Miller was written by Justice Kagan and joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Sotomayor. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito dissented.
3. Id. at 2469.
4. The Court has primarily used the term “irretrievably depraved” in this context. See,
e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (“Juveniles are more capable of change
than are adults, and their actions are less likely to be evidence of ‘irretrievably depraved
character’ than are the actions of adults.”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 553 (2005) (“The
reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity means it is less supportable to conclude
that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved
character.”).
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is an age below which life without parole for children, also known as
5
“juvenile life without parole” (JLWOP),
is categorically
unconstitutional; Evan Miller and Kuntrell Jackson, the petitioners in
Miller, had urged the Court to draw such a line for children who were
6
under fifteen at the time of their crimes.
In this essay, we argue that the Miller Court should have
categorically barred LWOP as a sentencing option for children
because, given the stakes, the risk of an erroneous determination
about a child’s “retrievability” is unacceptably high. Specifically, in
Part II we argue that the Court should have stayed true to its recent
recommitment to treating children as children even when they have
committed violent crimes. The attributes of childhood and
adolescence make it difficult (if not impossible) to know that a
particular child cannot be rehabilitated, and the understandable
politics and emotions associated with the sentencing process make it
likely that the sentence of LWOP will sometimes be imposed in
circumstances where the child can be rehabilitated. Consistent with
these concerns, in Part III we attempt to provide some guidance to
lawmakers who must abide by Miller’s terms and who are inclined to
do this “right” according to traditional principles of blameworthiness
and consistent with our modern concept of the child as a dependent,
developing individual. The essay concludes that the states’ approaches
to juvenile justice will continue to lack integrity until they are fully
consistent with this concept, including with the obligations it imposes
on adults and the government to provide affected children with the
opportunities necessary for decent outcomes.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH LIFE WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE
AS A SENTENCING OPTION FOR CHILDREN
Miller is the third in a series of recent decisions in which the Court
7
recognized that “children are different” in ways that diminish their
blameworthiness and thus implicate the Eighth Amendment’s
8
9
prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments.” Roper v. Simmons,
5. See, e.g., Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile
Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89 passim (2009) (using the acronym “JLWOP”).
6. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
7. Id. at 2470.
8. The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII.
9. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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decided in 2005, categorically barred the juvenile death penalty.
11
Graham v. Florida, decided in 2010, categorically barred life without
12
parole for juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses. As the
Court explained in Miller, Roper and Graham identified “three
significant gaps between juveniles and adults”:
First, children have a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility,” leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and
heedless risk-taking. Second, children “are more vulnerable . . . to
negative influences and outside pressures,” including from their
families and peers; they have limited “contro[l] over their own
environment” and lack the ability to extricate themselves from
horrific, crime-producing settings. And third, a child’s character is
not as “well formed” as an adult’s; his traits are “less fixed” and his
13
actions less likely to be “evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].”

In all three cases the Court found that these differences are
constitutionally significant because they “diminish the penological
justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile
14
offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes.” Specifically, the
Court found that such sentences cannot be justified by the law’s
15
interest in retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation.
In recognizing these factual and penological distinctions between
children and adults, the Court did not ignore that children sometimes
commit heinous crimes; nor did it ignore the resulting harm and
16
damage done to others. Rather, consistent with its Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence generally, it required that punishments be
proportional both to the crime and to the blameworthiness of the
17
criminal. It thus reaffirmed that our modern criminal justice system

10. See id. at 578 (“The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the
death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.”).
11. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
12. See id. at 2034 (“The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole
sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.”).
13. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (citations omitted) (quoting Roper, 543
U.S. at 569–70).
14. Id. at 2465.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., id. at 2469 (“No one can doubt that [Miller] and Smith committed a vicious
murder.”); id. (“That Miller deserved severe punishment for killing Cole Cannon is beyond
question.”). In addition to these express recognitions of the violence and personal loss at issue
in the cases are the recognitions implicit in the Court’s use of the victims’ names throughout its
opinion. See, e.g., id. at 2468 (referring to Jackson’s victim by her name, “Laurie Troup” and
“Troup,” in its description and analysis of the crime).
17. Id. at 2453, 2465–66.
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is no longer, as it was in centuries past, based on the “eye-for-an-eye”
18
principle. The Court also fully embraced the modern concept of the
child as a still-developing individual and citizen who, because of this,
sometimes makes bad decisions and thus requires the continuing
guidance and protection of responsible adults, including of the state as
19
parens patriae, until the age of majority.
The Miller Court parted ways with these philosophical guideposts,
however, at least in part because of the nagging possibility that some
particular child might be “irreparably corrupted” and thus warranting
20
permanent incapacitation. We believe that the Court was wrong to
do so. The imposition of any terminal punishment such as the death
penalty or life without parole, which reflects a final judgment that a
21
child is, in Justice Ginsburg’s words, a “throwaway person,” is both
negligent and cruel.
Imposing terminal punishments on children is negligent because it
allows the responsible adults and the state as “back-up parent” to
abandon their childrearing and child protection obligations with
impunity, and (relatedly) because it assumes that we can know
without ever trying that a child cannot be rehabilitated. The two
children in Miller are paradigmatic examples of this lack of
accountability: Both were involved in brutal, senseless crimes when
they were only fourteen. Up to that point, however, neither had ever
had the benefit of parents or guidance of the sort (either personal or
institutional) that our society assumes is required if children are to
22
grow into good adults and citizens. In effect, before they were
18. O. Carter Snead, Memory and Punishment, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1195, 1247–48 (2011).
19. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (noting that children have an “underdeveloped sense of
responsibility” and that their characters are “not as ‘well formed’ as an adult’s” (quoting Roper
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005))); SAMUEL M. DAVIS ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL
SYSTEM 1–2 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 4th ed. 2009); Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Legal
Ethics of Pediatric Research, 57 DUKE L.J. 517, 614–18 (2007).
20. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. The specter of the irretrievably depraved child who would
get away was first debated in Roper. Justice O’Connor, writing in dissent, was particularly
animated on the point that a seventeen-year-old murderer can be sufficiently and irretrievably
depraved so as to merit the death penalty, and thus the sentence ought not to have been
categorically barred. Roper, 544 U.S. at 599 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). She argued that
sentencing should be individualized to enable decisionmakers to distinguish among those who
are and are not so depraved. Id. at 602–03. In the course of her opinion, she rejected the notion
that the differences between children and adults, which she described as established “beyond
cavil,” require a finding that no individual child should be subject to the death penalty. Id. at
599.
21. Justice Ginsburg used this description during oral argument in Miller and Jackson.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (No. 10-9647).
22. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462, 2469 (discussing Miller’s childhood); id. at 2468 (noting
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incarcerated at the age of fourteen, they might as well have been
raised in the wild by the violent and irresponsible adults who
23
populated their inescapable lives. Miller’s background is particularly
extraordinary in this respect. As the Court explained, his “stepfather
physically abused him; his alcoholic and drug-addicted mother
neglected him; he had been in and out of foster care as a result; and
he had tried to kill himself four times, the first when he should have
24
been in kindergarten.” Because the prosecutors assigned to Miller’s
and Jackson’s cases chose to try them as adults and not as juveniles,
they were also never “parented” by the state either before or
following their incarcerations; they were simply transferred by their
25
parens patriae from one child-unfriendly environment to another.
Imposing such a terminal punishment on children is also cruel (in
the common if not also the legal sense of this term) because the
judgment, at the time it is made, can never be based on evidence
“beyond reasonable doubt,” which we should require for the
26
extraordinary decision to “throw away” a child. Beyond reasonable
doubt evidence of “irretrievable depravity” in children and
adolescents likely does not exist: despite some high-profile
27
suggestions to the contrary, neither social science nor neurobiology
in their current states can support the claim that a particular child,
28
even one who has been especially violent, will always be this way.

the pertinent facts of Jackson’s background).
23. Id. at 2462, 2468–69; see also Brief of Amici Curiae J. Lawrence Aber et al. in Support
of Petitioners at 21–28, 30–31, Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (No. 10-9646) (explaining the significance
of the child’s environment to both delinquency and rehabilitation).
24. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
25. Id. at 2461–62.
26. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (1970) (explaining that the reasonable doubt
standard is necessary to ensure “that the moral force of the criminal law [is] not . . . diluted by a
standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned”); id.
at 369–72 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that the reasonable doubt standard “is bottomed on a
fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man
than to let a guilty man go free”); see also Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
173, 198–99 (1977) (elaborating on this commitment).
27. See, e.g., Jennifer Kahn, Can You Call a 9-Year-Old a Psychopath?, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE (May 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/13/magazine/can-you-call-a-9year-old-a-psychopath.html (reporting on controversial therapists who believe they can
diagnose psychopathy in children); Elizabeth S. Scott, Juvenile Crime Regulation and the Moral
Panic Problem passim (2012) (unpublished paper) (on file with author) (describing unfounded
concerns about adolescent “superpredators”).
28. The Court in Roper explained that:
It is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile
offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption. . . . [T]his difficulty
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This is especially true when the subject of the inquiry is a younger
29
adolescent. And given the stakes involved in the decision to abandon
a child in prison, the issue of his irretrievability should not be resolved
permanently on the basis of anecdote, hunch, or even common sense.
The risk of error associated with these more traditional evidentiary
30
approaches is simply too high. Moreover, the Court itself noted in
Roper, “[a]n unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or coldblooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating
arguments based on youth as a matter of course, even where the
juvenile offender’s objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true
31
depravity should require a sentence less severe than death.”
Because this risk of error increases as the child’s age decreases, it
is particularly troubling that the Miller Court declined to decide the
issue whether there is an age below which JLWOP violates the Eighth
Amendment. Given the passions that are typically aroused by violent
underlies the rule forbidding psychiatrists from diagnosing any patient under 18 as
having antisocial personality disorder, a disorder also referred to as psychopathy or
sociopathy, and which is characterized by callousness, cynicism, and contempt for the
feelings, rights, and suffering of others.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005) (citations omitted); see also id. at 570 (“The reality
that juveniles still struggle to define their identity means it is less supportable to conclude that
even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character.”).
29. Brief of Amici Curiae J. Lawrence Aber et al. in Support of Petitioners, supra note 23,
at 29–31. Amici explained that:
Sentencing adolescents to life without parole is especially perverse from a
rehabilitative standpoint, because compared to adults, adolescents are particularly
amenable to change as they mature and develop. Studies demonstrate that most
adolescents will “age out” of their risk-taking behavior, fully develop their ability to
control impulses, and respond to meaningful incentives and opportunities to succeed.
Studies and statistics confirm that crime rates typically rise in early adolescence, peak
during mid-to-late adolescence, and then decline. Research indicates that most violent
adolescent offenders’ “criminal careers” span a period of less than one year. Thus, a
large majority of young adolescents will limit their deviant and antisocial behaviors to
their adolescent years.
Id. at 29–30 (footnotes omitted).
30. See, e.g., Neil Vidmar, James E. Coleman, Jr., and Theresa Newman, Rethinking
Reliance on Eyewitness Confidence, 94 JUDICATURE 16, 18 (2010) (explaining that jurors’
confidence in their common sense judgments about eyewitness identifications are misplaced).
31. Roper, 543 U.S. at 573. If there was any doubt about the latter, the Roper prosecutor’s
argument that, where a heinous crime is at issue, “youth [is] aggravating rather than mitigating,”
should cement the point. Id.; see also id. at 558 (“Age . . . . Think about age. Seventeen years
old. Isn’t that scary? Doesn’t that scare you? Mitigating? Quite the contrary I submit. Quite the
contrary.”); id. at 573 (explaining the prosecutor’s error in this regard). This claim is not merely
intuitive; as Professor Terry Maroney has shown, it also has empirical support. See Maroney,
supra note 5, at 123–26 (noting that judges tend to discount such evidence where the facts of the
crime are particularly violent); Scott, supra note 27, at 29–34 (describing the “moral panic”
phenomenon that causes decisionmakers in criminal cases to exaggerate the future threat and
thus to react with more emotion than rational judgment in the sentencing process).
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crime—passions that understandably cloud the judgment of even
well-meaning people—it is likely an insufficient safeguard merely to
suggest, as the Court did, that the sentence should be “uncommon” in
general, or that there may be some kind of sliding scale of
32
acceptability based on age. Indeed, in our view it is inevitable that
prosecutors, courts, and juries in individual cases will often presume
that their particular circumstances are uncommon—because the crime
itself should be, and because we hope that only the rare child would
be so involved—and thus it will take time, the commitment of untold
numbers of children to JLWOP, additional litigation against
sentencing regimes designed to circumvent Miller, and the
establishment of new jurisdictional patterns before a justiciable
33
measure of “(un)commonality” emerges.
It is not our position that the law ought to ignore the “rare case . . .
in which a juvenile offender has sufficient psychological maturity, and
at the same time demonstrates sufficient depravity, to merit a
34
[terminal] sentence.” As Justice O’Connor suggested in her dissent

32. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
33. This may indeed be a very long process. In Pennsylvania, where defense lawyers have
already begun the process of seeking parole for inmates currently under mandatory life
sentences for murders committed when they were juveniles, prosecutors show no willingness to
concede that any of the inmates were inappropriately sentenced to JLWOP. In testimony before
the Pennsylvania Senate Judiciary Committee on July 12, 2012, the Pennsylvania District
Attorneys Association argued against applying Miller retroactively and called for a minimum
sentence of sixty years before an inmate would be eligible for parole under a life sentence with
parole. See generally Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm. Regarding Juveniles Serving
Life Without Parole (2012) (testimony of Craig Stedman, Lancaster Cnty. Dist. Att’y), available
at http://senatorgreenleaf.com/judiciary/2012/071212/stedman.pdf. In Iowa, the Governor
peremptorily commuted the sentences of all inmates serving life without parole for murders
they committed as juveniles, but conditioned their parole on each inmate serving a minimum of
sixty years in prison. Brandstand Moves to Prevent the Release of Dangerous Murderers in Light
(July
16,
2012),
of
Recent
U.S.
Supreme
Court
Decision,
IOWA.GOV
https://governor.iowa.gov/2012/07/branstad-moves-to-prevent-the-release-of-dangerousmurderers-in-light-of-recent-u-s-supreme-court-decision/. According to the Governor’s press
release, his action “gives the opportunity for parole in compliance with the recent Supreme
Court decision; however, the action also protects victims from having to be re-victimized each
year by worrying about whether the Parole Board will release the murderer who killed their
loved one.” Id. The Governor’s action has been criticized by others and is being challenged in
court. See discussion infra note 54.
34. Roper, 543 U.S. at 572. Justice O’Connor, dissenting in Roper, made the point that the
evidence did not support the claim that such offenders are “rare.” Id. at 599–600. However one
might characterize that evidence, in our view it is reasonable to extrapolate from the scientific
facts of child development that fewer adolescents are irretrievable than retrievable, and that the
younger the adolescent is, the more likely he is to be retrievable. The latter is likely the basis for
the Miller majority’s dictum that the JLWOP sentence should be “uncommon,” particularly
when the defendant was fourteen at the time he committed the crime at issue. Miller, 132 S. Ct.
at 2469.
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in Roper, the public is understandably afraid of and has an interest in
permanently incapacitating true psychopaths as well as others whose
environments have so deeply and permanently damaged them that
35
they are, in effect, the equivalent of psychopaths. Moreover,
sentencing requires consideration of both proportionality and
blameworthiness, which means that serious attention must be paid
both to the crime and to the individual criminal. Because of this, it is
also important not to ignore the small risk of error in the other
direction: that a process that disallows JLWOP might result in an
36
“irretrievably depraved” child one day being paroled. This risk is
more theoretical than real, however, because it can be corrected by
the parole process itself; that is, as evidence of irretrievability mounts
over the years—either because the individual remains violent or
becomes increasingly so—the possibility of release becomes (or
37
should become) ever more remote. Of course the same cannot be
said of the individual who is prematurely labeled a “throwaway.” By
definition, the sentence of LWOP offers no possibility of error
38
correction.
III. GETTING JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE “RIGHT” AFTER
MILLER
Given the foregoing analysis, we turn to the difficult problem of
how to implement the Court’s decision in Miller, which allows states
to pursue JLWOP for a small number of juvenile offenders who are
“irretrievably depraved,” but provides little guidance for doing so.
This problem is especially difficult, because in our view, based on the
state of the scientific evidence, it is impossible to get JLWOP “right,”
especially when the sentencing decision is made soon after the
conviction. But because our goal in this essay is to offer suggestions

35. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 598–603 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (exploring when offenders
are sufficiently depraved to merit the death penalty).
36. This could happen for the same reason we should not permit terminal sentences: given
the state of the relevant science, we simply cannot know whether a child is retrievable. See supra
note 27 and accompanying text (elaborating on this point).
37. See, e.g., Charles Manson Skips His 12th Parole Hearing, FOXNEWS.COM, April 11,
2012, http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/04/11/manson-skips-12th-parole-hearing-may-be-his-last/
(making clear that Manson’s periodic, required parole hearings are basically pro forma and
given that he apparently remains both unrepentant and dangerous, it is widely expected that he
will die in jail).
38. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466 (“Imprisoning an offender until he dies alters the
remainder of his life ‘by a forfeiture that is irrevocable.’” (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct.
2011, 2027 (2010))).
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for how states might implement Miller responsibly, we proceed on the
basis it is possible at least to get it more right than not, and that there
are approaches that might be effective to minimize the risk of error.
The three approaches we present below meet Miller’s minimum
dictates, are consistent with the need to ensure that sentences in these
cases are proportional both to the crime and to the blameworthiness
of the individual, and are consistent with our prevailing concept of the
child.
A. The Legislative Choice to Eliminate JLWOP
As we have already intimated, the approach that is most faithful
to the trend in recent Supreme Court decisions dealing with severe
punishment of juveniles, to the modern concept of the child including
the appropriate role of the state in the child’s life, and to the scientific
facts about child development, is to eliminate JLWOP as a sentencing
option. We will not repeat this argument, which is set out in Part II,
except to emphasize that it does not put public safety at risk so long
as the parole process functions with integrity. A child who turns out to
be “irretrievably depraved” will not be paroled if he receives a
sentence less than JLWOP; his depravity will continue to manifest
over time and will be taken into consideration when a decision about
release must be made. The only implication for the state and society is
administrative: the obligation periodically to review the case to
establish either continued depravity or rehabilitation. It is our view
that such a relatively small burden is justified in circumstances where
the state incarcerates a child, potentially for life.
This approach is consistent with Miller, which merely sets
minimum constitutional requirements for states that choose to permit
children to be sentenced to LWOP. Indeed, the case can be viewed as
an invitation to the states to examine comprehensively their
sentencing laws to determine if the JLWOP option was intentional or
39
the unintended consequence of their waiver statutes. The
opportunity to remedy the negative effects of what Professor
Elizabeth Scott has called a “moral panic” about an imaginary
generation of child “superpredators” that caused legislatures in the

39. Id. at 2472–73. For another (particularly troubling) example of the unintended
consequences of waiver statutes, see Editorial, Adolescents in Grown-Up Jails, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
15,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/16/opinion/adolescents-in-grown-upjails.html?src=recg (describing how, in order to separate them from the adult prisoner
population, adolescent prisoners are sometimes placed in solitary confinement).
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1990s improvidently to enact many of the associated statutes could be
sufficiently appealing in the current political and criminological
40
period.
B. The Legislative Choice to Delay the Parole Decision
A second, intermediate approach would be to impose a
conditional sentence of life in prison, but to delay the parole decision
to give the state, in its role as parens patriae, an opportunity to
stabilize and evaluate the child. Depending upon his age at the time
of the conviction, the interim period could extend from conviction
until the child reaches the age of majority, or it could be established
for some predetermined number of years. In any event, the period
selected would have to be sufficient to permit a meaningful decision
about parole, taking into consideration the offender’s development,
his background up to the time of his offense, and the evidence of
potential for rehabilitation. During this period, the state would
provide the child with an age-appropriate environment and evidencebased opportunities for rehabilitation. Once this interim period was
over, an appropriate board or commission would hear relevant
evidence from both the child and the state and make the final
determination whether the child’s life sentence was with or without
the possibility of parole.
In addition to ensuring that the state was not “throwing away” a
child upon conviction and that it was undertaking its own child
welfare and child protection responsibilities, this interim period
between conviction and the parole eligibility decision would afford
the state valuable evidence of retrievability or irretrievability. This
new evidence would not eliminate the risk of an erroneous decision
about the child’s essential nature, but it could significantly reduce it.
Importantly, the interim period would also provide a cooling off
period between the crime and conviction on the one hand and the
parole decision on the other, thus further ensuring that the emotions
surrounding the crime were properly balanced against the child’s
culpability.
Structuring the delay and delineating the terms of the state’s
responsibilities necessarily would be decided on a state-by-state basis.
This would permit experimentation and development of best
practices. Nevertheless, to have the desired impact, certain conditions
40. Scott, supra note 27, at 11.
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would have to be mandatory for all states.
First, there would be no consideration of parole at the time of
conviction so as to avoid a decision dictated largely by the emotional
impact of the crime on the jury. Otherwise, the likely inclination of
jurors would be to deny parole eligibility. Even an interim suggestion
to deny parole would make it politically difficult for a subsequent jury
or parole board to reach a contrary decision.
Second, for evidence of potential for rehabilitation to be
meaningful, there would have to be a real and sustained effort by the
state to “retrieve” the child during the period between conviction and
the parole decision; indeed, that would be the principal reason to
delay the parole eligibility decision.
Third, the actual parole decision would be made only at the end of
the interim period, when fully-developed evidence would be available
for the decision. Any interim decision would be inadequately
informed and likely to change the focus of the final decision from
whether the evidence supports giving the offender an opportunity for
parole to whether subsequent evidence changed the interim decision.
Fourth, the parole decision-maker optimally would be a judicial or
quasi-judicial board whose members would include experts in the
fields of child development and psychopathology, as well as parole
experts. Such a board fits nicely with current parole systems following
41
best practices.
C. The Legislative Choice to Permit the Sentence of JLWOP
According to Strict Procedural Safeguards
The third approach is the least protective of the three. It assumes a
political environment in which the first two approaches are not viable
and is based on the features suggested or mandated by Miller.
Relatedly, it mirrors individualized sentencing in capital cases, with
42
which states allowing JLWOP at the time of Miller are familiar. Its
41. For an example of current best practices, see generally NAT’L INST. OF CORRECTIONS,
CORE COMPETENCIES: A RESOURCE FOR PAROLE BOARD CHAIRS, MEMBERS, AND
EXECUTIVE STAFF 23 (2010), available at http://static.nicic.gov/Library/024197.pdf
(recommending collaborative approaches and evidence-based decisionmaking in parole).
42. See generally, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (requiring
individualized sentencing in capital cases); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (same). In
Miller, the Court identified fifteen jurisdictions that permit the sentence of JLWOP and twentynine that make it mandatory in certain circumstances. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471 n.10 (citing State
Distribution of Youth Offenders Serving Juvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP), HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 2, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/10/02/state-distribution-juvenile-
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exact contours would emerge over time, but should include at least
the following:
First, sentencing should occur in a separate phase of the trial that
follows conviction. Although Miller does not dictate this, it is the only
practical way to implement those conditions that the Court has
mandated. This is because the decision whether to make the offender
eligible for parole involves consideration of information and factors
that would be inappropriate for consideration in the portion of the
trial focused primarily on the murder and whether the defendant is
43
guilty. As the Court recognized in Gregg v. Georgia and Woodson v.
44
North Carolina, the individualized decision contemplated in Miller
requires a procedural mechanism that ensures the focus for the
45
decision will be on all of the relevant factors and not just the crime.
Second, the sentencing phase of the trial should be designed in
such a way as to ensure to the extent possible that the jurors’
emotional reactions to the crime do not unduly influence its
46
consideration of the child’s blameworthiness. Thus, the presentation
of and response to the prosecution’s aggravating evidence should be
formally separated from the presentation of and response to the
defendant’s mitigating evidence. The rules of evidence also should be
relaxed in this part of the proceeding to permit a more natural
47
presentation of information to the jury.
offenders-serving-juvenile-life-without-parole). The majority of those jurisdictions are also
death penalty states. See States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY
INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last
visited Sept. 22, 2012).
43. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
44. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
45. See id. at 304 (“[I]n capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the
Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the character and record of the individual
offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensible part
of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.” (citation omitted)); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206
(“The new Georgia sentencing procedures . . . focus the jury’s attention on the particularized
nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant,” and “[i]n
this way the jury’s discretion is channeled.”).
46. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (noting that prosecutors have cast
defendants’ young age as “scary” rather than as a mitigating factor, that judges tend to discount
evidence of youth, and that decisionmakers exaggerate future threat).
47. In the sentencing phase of a capital trial, some rules of evidence are relaxed. In
Florida, for example, a juror can find a mitigating circumstance if it is proven by a
preponderance of the evidence. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.11, available at
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/jury_instructions/instructions.shtml#. In addition, the U.S.
Supreme Court has reversed a death sentence because a state court barred the use of hearsay
evidence to prove a mitigating circumstance. See generally Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979).
In North Carolina, hearsay evidence is permitted if the other side has an opportunity to rebut it.
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Third, specifically with respect to mitigating evidence, Miller
requires that the sentencing authority, in its consideration of the
child’s blameworthiness, hear and consider both scientific evidence
about child development in general and evidence concerning the
48
particular child defendant’s life circumstances and role in the crime.
Specifically with respect to child development science, Miller requires
that jurors hear about and consider the child’s “chronological age and
its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and
failure to appreciate risks and consequences” and “how those
[features] counsel against irrevocably sentencing [him] to a lifetime in
49
prison.” And with respect to the child himself, Miller requires that
jurors hear about and consider “the family and home environment
that surrounds him—and from which he cannot usually extricate
himself . . . [and] the circumstances of the homicide offense, including
the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and
50
peer pressures may have affected him.” Importantly, the Court
emphasized that a violent childhood and environment and violent
51
adult role models are to be considered mitigating, not aggravating.
We would anticipate that, over time, developing this evidence would
allow states to decide before going to a sentencing phase that a
sentence of life without the possibility of parole was inappropriate in
particular cases.
Fourth, the final sentencing decision should require the jury to
balance the aggravated nature of the crime against the child’s
52
blameworthiness. In this context, the jury should be required to
determine if the state has shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the

See generally State v. Strickland, 488 S.E.2d 194 (N.C. 1997). Some states may permit the
prosecutor to use hearsay evidence to rebut mitigating evidence but not to prove aggravating
circumstances. The prosecution’s use of hearsay may be barred in some circumstances as a
matter of constitutional law. See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (holding
that some out-of-court statements may violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment).
48. Providing this template for sentencing at least minimizes the extent to which judges
can ignore or give short shrift to relevant scientific evidence about child development. See
Maroney, supra note 5, at 119–28.
49. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468–69 (2012).
50. Id. at 2468.
51. Id. (discussing “Jackson’s family background and immersion in violence” and noting as
an example that “[b]oth his mother and his grandmother had previously shot other
individuals”). See also supra note 24 and accomanying text (elaborating on Jackson’s violent
upbringing).
52. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (emphasizing that punishments must be
proportional to the blameworthiness of the criminal, in addition to the crime).
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53

defendant is “irretrievably depraved.” If the jury has a reasonable
doubt about that ultimate issue, it should sentence the juvenile to life
with the possibility of parole, after some minimum number of years in
54
prison, likely between fifteen and thirty years.
One final, cautionary note about this approach: The inclination of
some states will be simply to duplicate the individualized sentencing
process used in capital cases whenever a child is convicted of a
murder for which an adult would automatically be sentenced to
LWOP. But going immediately to the sentencing phase of a trial in
that manner likely would expose too many children—such as Kuntrell
Jackson, for example, who neither killed nor likely intended to kill—
55
to an erroneous JLWOP sentence. Because of this, states should
53. Capital sentencing generally requires that a jury find the existence of aggravating
factors, not just the elements of the crime, beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 608–09 (2002) (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000)).
54. North Carolina, for example, amended its sentencing for minors subject to life
imprisonment without parole to provide that the alternative “life imprisonment with parole”
means “the defendant shall serve a minimum of 25 years imprisonment prior to becoming
eligible for parole.” An Act to Amend the State Sentencing Laws to Comply with the United
States Supreme Court Decision in Miller v. Alabama, S.L. 2012-148, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws (to be
codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §15A-1476). But some states may try to circumvent Miller by
establishing a minimum term for life with parole that effectively will be a life sentence without
parole. In Iowa, at about the same time that the North Carolina statute was enacted, the
Governor announced that he would “commute the life without parole sentences today to life
with the possibility of parole only after 60 years for the 38 people who were convicted of First
Degree Murder while a juvenile.” Brandstand Moves to Prevent the Release of Dangerous
Murderers in Light of Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decision, IOWA.GOV (July 16, 2012),
https://governor.iowa.gov/2012/07/branstad-moves-to-prevent-the-release-of-dangerousmurderers-in-light-of-recent-u-s-supreme-court-decision/. His action has been challenged as
being inconsistent with Miller. See State v. Lockheart, No. 10-1815, 2012 WL 2814378 (Iowa Ct.
App. July 11, 2012). We believe that a minimum term for life with the possibility of parole
should be consistent with principles of child development. Some states might decide that a
JLWOP sentence is categorically inappropriate for juveniles below a certain age or for juveniles
who did not kill and whose role in the homicide was relatively minor. Compare Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 137–38 (1987) (holding the death penalty not disproportionate for
defendants who have major participation in murder with the mental state of reckless
indifference), with Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 782 (1982) (holding the death penalty
disproportionate for a robber who does not take human life). These cases do not reference age.
Eventually, a trend in such policies might result in the Supreme Court revisiting issues left open
in Miller. Cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989);
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
55. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475 (Breyer, J., concurring) (opining that unless the State can
show that Jackson intended to kill the victim in his case, Laurie Troup, he should not be eligible
for JLWOP on re-sentencing). The majority’s opinion explains that “Jackson did not fire the
bullet that killed Laurie Troup nor did the State argue that he intended her death.” Id. at 2468
(majority opinion). Jackson’s conviction was instead based on an aiding-and-abetting theory,
and the appellate court affirmed the verdict only because the jury could have believed that
when Jackson entered the store, he warned Troup that “[w]e ain’t playin’,” not “I thought you
all was playin’.” Id. at 2468. In capital cases, the Court has barred categorically the death
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consider a threshold, gatekeeping mechanism to ensure that only
those children who are potentially “irretrievably depraved” will face a
sentencing phase trial to determine if they should be subject to
LWOP. The jury could make that decision as a threshold matter, in the
same way that capital juries first determine if a statutory aggravating
circumstance exists to make a capital defendant eligible for the death
56
penalty. The parties could prepare for such a hearing as they are
preparing the case for trial, in the same manner as a capital case. Both
sides could have ready, almost immediately after trial, prepared
reports by their experts setting out general information about child
development, information about the particular child’s development
and potential for rehabilitation, and information about the child’s role
in the murder. That would be sufficient to permit the court to decide
whether the case involves an “uncommon” child who may be
“irretrievably depraved.”
IV. CONCLUSION
It is inherent in our culture and law that, biological distinctions
57
aside, children are a tabula rasa. It is because of this idea that we give
the adults in their lives so much freedom and power to control their
environments and to form their characters. It is also because of this
idea that periodically we fight as a body politic about the balance of
58
that freedom and power among parents and the state. Importantly,
penalty for accomplices such as Jackson whose roles in the underlying felony were relatively
minor and who did not act with reckless indifference to the life of the victim. Cf., Tison, 481 U.S.
at 137–38 (“The Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the death penalty as disproportionate in
the case of a defendant whose participation in a felony that results in murder is major and
whose mental state is one of reckless indifference.”); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797 (“[T]he death
penalty . . . is an excessive penalty for the robber who, as such, does not take human life.”).
56. If the question whether the defendant is “irretrievably depraved” is considered an
aggravating factor, beyond what is necessary to convict the juvenile of murder, the Sixth
Amendment likely would require the determination to be made by a jury. See, e.g., Ring, 536
U.S. at 589. In that event, the Constitution also would prevent the state from shifting the burden
to the defendant by establishing a rebuttable presumption that any juvenile who commits
murder is irretrievably depraved. See, e.g., Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 318 (1985).
57. See, e.g., NEIL POSTMAN, THE DISAPPEARANCE OF CHILDHOOD 57 (1982) (describing
the origins of this idea in John Locke’s view of childhood and the role of education in society);
Locke, John (1632-1704), ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHILDREN AND CHILDHOOD IN HISTORY AND
SOCIETY, http://www.faqs.org/childhood/Ke-Me/Locke-John-1632-1704.html (last visited Sept.
30, 2012) (describing the origins of the idea in elaborate detail).
58. The so-called “culture wars” throughout modern United States history have been
motivated primarily by these concerns. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923)
(involving politicians and citizens battling over whether immigrants have the right to inculcate
their children according to their “foreign tongues and ideals”); Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1060 (6th Cir. 1987) (involving a school board and citizens battling over
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adults seek to control children through the age of majority at least in
part because we believe that it is possible to have real influence over
the child’s character, values, and commitments through late
59
adolescence. Indeed, examples abound of our conviction that
children in mid-to-late adolescence are particularly malleable in these
respects—from parents who take their children out of high school to
minimize the extent to which they can be socialized by teachers and
60
peers to high school administrators who, often with the support of
parents’ associations, devote significant (and precious) time and
61
money to co-curricular behavior management and values education.
We cannot simultaneously subscribe to this idea and its associated
politics and also believe that we are reasonable when first we
abandon a child and then imprison him for life without the possibility
of parole when he goes astray. Our approach to children in the law is
one of rights and responsibilities: adults, including both parents and
the state, have rights of control that they are responsible to exercise in
62
the children’s best interests. When we fail, utterly, to write a good or
at least a minimally decent childhood onto the tabula rasa, we have
failed in our responsibilities. In such cases, we are blameworthy.
To assure that we do not fail the child who is subject to the penal
system, we must continue to treat him as the child he is. Until we are
provided with unassailable evidence of his irreparable corruption as
an adult, we must continue to assume—as we do for our other
children who are not subject to the penal system—that the story of his
character, values, and potential is not yet entirely written. In the

whether fundamentalist Christians have the right to influence the curriculum of the public
schools).
59. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972) (seeking control over children’s
associations and education especially beginning at age fourteen); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 397–98
(seeking control over the curriculum of children through the eighth grade).
60. Yoder is the best-known Supreme Court decision ratifying the legitimacy of this view,
but it is certainly not limited to the Court or to the Amish. See, e.g., Benefits to Homeschooling:
A Growing List from Our Homeschool Family to Yours, PEAH’S HOMESHOOL-CURRICULUMSAVINGS.COM, http://www.homeschool-curriculum-savings.com/benefits-to-homeschooling.html
(last visited Sept. 7, 2012) (listing “more opportunities for character building,” “less peer
pressure,” and “more control over outside influences” as reasons to homeschool children and
teenagers).
61. See, e.g., Edward J. Klesse and Jan A. D’Onofrio, The Value of Co-Curricular
LEADERSHIP,
Oct.
2000,
at
6,
available
at
Activities,
PRINCIPAL
www.nassp.org/portals/0/content/48943.pdf (describing the development of co-curricular
programs and opportunities for children, including in high school, to minimize their engagement
in risk-taking behaviors and to “foster positive character traits . . . [and] success in later life”).
62. DAVIS, supra note 19, at 1–2.
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process, we cannot allow ourselves to think that merely re-labeling
him a “juvenile” somehow transforms either his essential nature or
our essential responsibilities toward him. We cannot have it both
ways: he is and remains a child until the age of majority, and we
largely write his story.

